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Abstract—We evaluate and quantify the joint effect of fading
and multiple interferers on the physical-layer (PHY) security of
a system consisted of a base-station (BS), a legitimate user, and
an eavesdropper. To this end, we present a novel closed-form
expression for the secrecy outage probability, which takes into
account the fading characteristics of the wireless environment, the
location and the number of interferers, as well as the transmission
power of the BS and the interference. The results reveal that the
impact of interference should be seriously taken into account
in the design and deployment of a wireless system with PHY
security.
Index Terms—Interference, Secrecy Outage Probability, Phys-
ical layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
P
hysical layer (PHY) security has received significant at-
tention in the last years, since it can provide reliable
and secure communication by employing the fundamental
characteristics of the transmission medium, such as multi-path
fading [1], [2]. As a result, a great amount of effort was put in
analyzing the performance of such systems. Scanning the open
literature, most of the related works have neglected the impact
of interference and fading on the security performance of
wireless systems. However, in modern heterogeneous wireless
enviroments, interference is an inevitable key factor for the
communication system’s performance [3].
The above mentioned scenarios motivated a general investi-
gation of the effect of interference on the security performance
of wireless systems [4], [5]. Specifically, a scenario where
two independent confidential messages are transmitted to their
respective receivers (RXs), which interfere with each other
was examined in [6]. In this work, the equivocation rate
at the eavesdropper was used as a metric to ensure mutual
information-theoretic secrecy. Furthermore, in [7], the problem
of security in the presence of interference was examined from
a similar point of view, where two transmitters (TXs) sent
two messages to a cognitive RX, who should be able to
decode both messages, and a non-cognitive RX, which is able
to decode only one message, while the other is kept secret.
Moreover, in [8], a system that consisted of a primary TX-
RX pair, as well as a number of secondary transceivers, and
a single eavesdropper, was examined. However, in [8], the
impact of multipath fading was neglected. In [9], the secrecy
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capacity was investigated for a cognitive radio system with
security based on artificial noise, assuming full channel state
information (CSI) knowledge for the legitimate RX’s channel,
and partial CSI for the eavesdropper’s channel. Finally, the
impact of interference on multi-user scheduling transmission
schemes was investigated in [10] and [11]. However, in these
works the fading characteristics of the interference channels
were not taken into consideration.
To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the joint effect
of interference and fading in PHY security has not been
addressed in the open technical literature. Motivated by this,
in this paper, we examine PHY security for a system, where
a TX aims to communicate securely with a legitimate RX, in
the presence of an eavesdropper. The signals transmitted by an
arbitrary number of base-stations (BSs) cause interference in
the signals received by the legitimate RX and the eavesdropper.
All TXs and RXs are assumed to be equipped with a single
antenna. Also, all wireless links are subject to Rayleigh fading,
and statistical CSI is assumed for all channels. To this end,
a closed-form expression for the secrecy outage probability
(SOP) is derived.
II. SYSTEM AND SIGNAL MODEL
We consider the downlink scenario in a wireless network
that consists of a BS, which aims to transmit a confidential
message to a legitimate user, in the presence of an eavesdrop-
per, and M other BSs, which operate in the same frequency
band, i.e., they are interferers. For convenience, in what
follows, we will refer to the BS as Alice (A), the legitimate
user as Bob (B), and the eavesdropper as Eve (E).
The baseband equivalent signals received by B and E can
be respectively obtained as
yB = hBx+
M∑
i=1
hBixi + nB, (1)
yE = hEx+
M∑
i=1
hEixi + nE , (2)
where x denotes the transmitted signal by A, and xi denotes
the transmitted signal by the i-th interferer. Also, nB and
nE are zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables (RVs)
that models the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN), with
power spectral densityN0 at both B’s and E’s RXs. Moreover,
the baseband equivalent channel between A and B is denoted
by hB , while the one between A and E by hE . The baseband
equivalent channels between the i-th interferer and B are
denoted by hBi, whereas those between the i-th interferer
2and E by hEi. Due to the distance, dX , between A and
node X ∈ {B,E}, the channel gain can be expressed as
in [12], hX =
gX√
1+dα
X
, where gX and α denote the fading
channel and the path loss coefficients, respectively. Similarly,
the channel gain between the i-th interferer and node X is
given by hX i =
gXi√
1+dα
Xi
, where X ∈ {B,E}, while gX i
denotes the fading channel coefficient, and dX i denotes the
distance between the i-th interferer and node X . Note that gX
and gX i are zero-mean complex Gaussian RVs with variance
equals 1. Hence, |gX |2 and |gX i|2 follow Rayleigh distribution.
Based on (1) and (2), the instantaneous signal to interference
and noise ratio (SINR) at B and E can be expressed as
γX =
Es
1+dα
X
|gX |2
N0 +
∑M
i=1 |gX i|2 Esi1+dα
Xi
, (3)
where Es represents the energy of the signal transmitted by
Alice, while Esi represents the energy of the signal transmitted
by the i-th interferer.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this section, we evaluate the SOP, which is defined as
the probability that the secrecy capacity is lower than a target
secrecy rate, rs, i.e., Po(rs) = Pr (CB − CE ≤ rs) , or
Po(rs) = Pr
(
log2
(
γB + 1
γE + 1
)
≤ rs
)
, (4)
where CB = log2 (γB + 1) and CE = log2 (γE + 1) denote
the capacity of A-B and A-E links, respectively.
Theorem 1. The SOP can be expressed in closed form as
in (5), given at the top of the next page. In (5),
K =
1
γ˜B
2−rs +
1
γ˜E
, (6)
LBi =
Es − (1 + dαB)bBi
(1 + dαB)2
rsbBi
, (7)
LEj =
Es − (1 + dαE)bEj
(1 + dαE)bEj
, (8)
while γ˜B =
Es
(1+da
B
)N0
and γ˜E =
Es
(1+da
E
)N0
. Also, ΞX (i),
X ∈ {B,E} is defined in [13, Eqs. (8) and (9)]1 and Ei(·) is
the exponential integral function defined in [15, Eq. (5.1.4)].
Proof: Please refer to the Appendix.
Theorem 1 reveals that the SOP does not only depend on
the characteristics of the links between A and B/E, but also on
the characteristics of the links between the interferers and B/E,
as well as the number of interferers. In other words, Theorem
1 quantifies the importance of taking into account the impact
of interference in PHY security.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we evaluate and illustrate the joint effect of
fading and interference on the performance of wireless systems
with PHY security. Unless otherwise stated, we assume that
the distance between Alice and Bob is 2.5 m, while the
distance between Alice and Eve is 25 m. Also, there are
1Note that there is a typo in [13, Eqs. (8)]. The correct expression is
provided in [14].
three interfering BSs, and their normalized distances from Bob
are 10, 20 and 25, whereas their corresponding normalized
distances from Eve are 15, 10 and 5. In all cases, the
target secrecy rate rs is expressed in bit/s/Hz. Moreover, it
is assumed that the signals transmitted by the interferers have
equal energy, denoted by EsI .
Fig. 1 depicts the SOP as a function of Es/N0 for different
values of rs and EsI/N0, and α = 3. We observe that the SOP
decreases as Es/N0 increases. Furthermore, for given Es/N0
and EsI/N0, higher rates lead to higher values of the SOP.
Also, in the examined scenario, in the low Es/N0 regime,
low values for the SOP are achieved if the interferers have
low EsI/N0. On the other hand, in the high Es/N0 regime,
low values of the SOP are achieved if the interferers have
high EsI/N0.
In Fig. 2, the SOP is illustrated as a function of rs for
different values of Es/N0 and α. We observe that, regardless
of the values of Es/N0 and α, as rs increases, the SOP also
increases. Furthermore, for given rs and α, the increase of
Es/N0 results in lower values for the SOP. On the other hand,
the impact of α on the SOP is not as straightforward. For fixed
Es/N0, α = 4 yields the highest SOP in almost all the rs
regime. However, the SOP for α = 2 is higher than for α = 3
when Es/N0 = 40 dB, while the SOP for α = 3 is higher than
for α = 2 when Es/N0 = 20 dB or Es/N0 = 30 dB. This
behavior indicates the dependence of the secrecy performance
on the spatial placement of the elements of the system as well
as the pathloss parameters.
Fig. 3 demonstrates the SOP as a function of EsI/N0 for
different values of rs and Es/N0, and α = 3. Regardless of
the values of EsI/N0 and Es/N0, it can be seen that for given
EsI/N0 and Es/N0, as rs increases, the SOP also increases.
However, for given rs, higher values of Es/N0 lead to a
lower SOP. Moreover, it is observed that as EsI/N0 changes,
the behavior of the SOP is not straightforward. Specifically,
in some cases we observe that as EsI/N0 increases, the
SOP decreases until a certain point, and increases afterwards.
This is expected, because the interferers are, on average,
closer to Eve than to Bob. Therefore, an increase in EsI
is more beneficial to Bob than to Eve. However, as EsI
increases, the energy of the signal received by Bob from Alice
becomes smaller compared to the energy received from the
interferers. Therefore, the capacity of the Alice-Bob and Alice-
Eve channels tend to zero, and so does the secrecy capacity,
leading to higher values of the SOP.
Next, we present the impact of interference on PHY security
for different positions of Eve. We assume that Alice, Bob and
the interferers are placed at fixed locations, while Eve can be
placed at 1 m intervals on a staight line that goes through
Alice and Bob, up to 20 m from Alice. Also, in this scenario,
EsI/N0 = 35 dB and α = 3. In Fig. 4, we observe that, for
a fixed rs, when dE increases, the SOP decreases. Moreover,
we observe that, for fixed Es/N0 and dE , higher values rs
lead to a higher SOP. In all cases, when Eve moves further
from Alice and closer to the interferers, the SOP decreases.
Finally, we investigate the impact of the number of inter-
fering BSs on the SOP. Fig. 5 depicts the SOP as a function
of Es/N0 for different values of rs and M . Also, it was
3Po(rs) = 1− EsN0
2rs(1 + dαB)
e
(
1
γ˜B
+ 1
γ˜E
)
×
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
ΞB(i)ΞE(j)
bBibEj
(
γ˜Ee
−K
(LEj − 1)(LBi − LEj)−
Kγ˜Ee
LEjKEi (− (LEj + 1)K)
(LBi − LEj) +
γ˜Ee
LBiKEi (− (LBi + 1)K)
LBi − LEj
− γ˜Ee
LEjKEi (− (LEj + 1)K)
LBi − LEj +
eKLBiEi (−(1 + LBi)K)
LEj − LBi −
eKLEjEi (−(1 + LEj)K)
LEj − LBi
)
. (5)
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Fig. 1: SOP against Es/N0 for different values of rs and
EsI/N0.
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Fig. 2: SOP against rs for different values of α and Es/N0.
assumed that EsI/N0 = 25dB and α = 3. The distance
between Alice-Bob and Alice-Eve was dB = 1 m and dE = 10
m, respectively. It was assumed that the locations of Alice,
Bob, Eve, and the interfering BSs are collinear, and all other
elements are on the same side of the line, as defined by Alice’s
location. The distance of the first interfering BS from Alice
was 15 m, and each consecutive BS was placed 1 m closer
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Fig. 3: SOP against EsI for different values of rs and Es/N0.
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Fig. 4: SOP against dE for different values of rs and Es/N0.
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Fig. 5: SOP against Es/N0 for different values of M and rs.
to Alice. We observe that, as the value of Es/N0 increases,
the SOP decreases. In the low Es/N0 regime, a lower number
of interferers leads to a lower SOP, but in the high Es/N0
regime, a larger number of interferers leads to a lower SOP.
These results indicate the need to take into consideration the
number of interfering BSs in the evaluation of PHY security
in a wireless system.
APPENDIX
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The SOP can be expressed as Po(rs) = Pr
(
X
Y
≤ 2rs) .
where X = γB + 1 and Y = γE + 1. In order to evaluate
the SOP, we first evaluate the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of the SNR at Bob and Eve, which can be obtained as
FγX (x) =
ˆ ∞
N0
FA(yx)fB(y)dy, (9)
where FAX (x) is the CDF of the RV AX , which is given by
AX =
Es
1+da
X
|gX |2, while fBX (x) is the probability density
function (PDF) of the RV BX , which can be expressed as
BX = N0 +
∑M
i=1 |gX i|2 Esi1+dα
Xi
. Notice, that AX and BX are
independent RVs.
4Based on [16], AX follows Rayleigh distribution with CDF
given by FAX (x) = 1 − e−
1+dα
X
Es
x
. Moreover, since BX is a
weighted sum of Rayleigh distributed RVs, it distribution can
be obtained as in [13], and its PDF can be expressed as
fBX (x) =
M∑
i=1
ΞX (i)
bX i
e
x−N0
bXi , (10)
where bX i =
Esi
2(1+dα
Xi
) . The expressions for bBi and bEi are
used in the definitions of ΞB(i) and ΞE(i), respectively. Next,
by substituting (10) into (9), and after some simplifications,
we obtain
FγX (x) = 1−
M∑
i=1
ΞX (i)
bX i
ˆ ∞
N0
e
(
−
1+dα
X
Es
yx−
y−N0
bXi
)
dy. (11)
By evaluating the integral in (11), we obtain
FγX(x)=1−
M∑
i=1
EsΞX (i)e
−
(1+dα
X
)N0x
Es
Es + (1 + dαX )bX ix
. (12)
Next, the CDFs of X can be derived as FX(x) = FγB (x−1),
or equivalently
FX(x) = 1−
M∑
i=1
ΞB(i)Ese
−
(1+dα
B
)N0(x−1)
Es
Es + (1 + dαB)bBi(x− 1)
. (13)
Additionally, the PDF of Y can be derived as fY (x) =
dFγE (x−1)
dx
which, after some algebraic manipulations, can be
rewritten as
fY (x) = (1 + d
α
E)e
−
(1+dα
E
)N0(x−1)
Es
×
M∑
i=1
ΞE(i)
(
EsbEi
(Es + bEi(1 + dαE)(x − 1))2
+
N0
Es + bEi(1 + dαE)(x− 1)
)
. (14)
Since X and Y are independent RV, the SOP can be
obtained as
Po(rs) =
ˆ ∞
1
FX(2
rsx)fY (x)dx. (15)
By substituting (13) and (14) into (15), and after some
mathematical manipulations, we get
Po(rs) = 1−
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
EsN0ΞB(i)ΞE(j)e
(
1
γ˜B
+ 1
γ˜E
)
2rsbBibEj(1 + dαB)
× (γ˜EI1 + I2) , (16)
where I1 and I2 can be respectively expressed as
I1 =
ˆ ∞
1
e−Ky
(LBi + y) (LEj + y)
2 dy (17)
and
I2 =
ˆ
∞
1
e−Ky
(LBi + y) (LEj + y)
dy. (18)
By setting z = y−1 into (17) and (18) and after some basic
algebraic manipulations and the use of [17, Eq.8.359.1], (17)
can be rewritten as
I1= e
−K
(LEj − 1)(LBi − LEj)−
KeLEjKEi (−(LEj + 1)K)
LBi − LEj
+
eLBiKEi(−(LBi + 1)K)
LBi − LEj −
eLEjKEi(−(LEj + 1)K)
LBi − LEj (19)
I2=e
KLBiEi(−(1+LBi)K)
LEj − LBi −
eKLEjEi(−(1+LEj)K)
LEj − LBi . (20)
Finally, by substituting (19) and (20) into (16), we ob-
tain (5). This concludes the proof.
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